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CHARITABLE TRUSTS AND INDUCEMENTS
TO VIOLATE THE LAW
In order to establish a valid charitable trust it is, of course, nec-
essary that the trust funds are to be used for a charitable purpose.'
The courts have had considerable difficulty in delineating the field of
activities to which the term "charitable" may properly be applied.
There is general agreement that gifts for the promotion of health, ed-
ucation, religion, relief to the poor and governmental purposes will
be upheld as satisfying the charitable purpose requirement.2 Unless
the gift falls within one of these categories, a finding that the gift
will result in some definite advantage to society is required.3 The
standards for determining what constitutes a significant social advan-
tage are by no means clear as courts may readily disagree on what is
or is not beneficial to the community.4
'A charitable purpose is the most fundamental requirement necessary for the
valid creation of a charitable trust; that is-the legal justification for these devices
is that they confer a substantial benefit on some part of society. While private
trusts require tht the trust instrument designate definite beneficiaries, charitable
trusts are designed to benefit a segment of society. Hence, the beneficiaries must
be an indefinite number or class of people. Otherwise the elements of a charitable
trust are essentially the same as those of a private trust. La Societe Francaise De
Bienfaisance Mutuelle v. California Employment Comm'n, 56 Cal. App. 2d 534, 133
P.2d 47 (1943); Scripps Memorial Hospital v. California Employment Comm'n, 24
Cal. 2d 669, 151 P.2d io9 (1944); People v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 365 Ill.
118, 6 N.E.2d 166 (1937). See generally 2A Bogert, Trusts and Trustees §§ 361-62
(1953); 4 Scott, Trusts § 348 (2d ed. 1956); Restatement (Second), Trusts § 348 (1959)-
2In re Henderson's Estate, 17 Cal. 2d 853, 112 P. 2d 65 (1941); Mitchell v.
Reeves, 123 Conn. 549, 196 AtI. 785 (1938); Andrews v. Young Men's Christian
Ass'n, 226 Iowa 374, 284 N.V. 186 (1939); In re Weeks' Estate, 154 Kan. 103, 114
P.2d 857 (1941); 2A Bogert, Trust and Trustees §§ 373-78 (1953); Scott, 4 Trusts §§
367-74 (2d ed. 1956); Restatement (Second), Trusts §§ 368-77 (1956).
3In addition to gifts for the promotion of health, education, religion, relief to
the poor and governmental purposes the following purposes have been held to be
beneficial to the community and hence charitable: Promotion of temperance,
People v. Dashway Ass'n, 84 Cal. 114, 24 Pac. 277 (1890); Dirlam v. Morrow, 1o2
Ohio St. 279, 131 N.E. 365 (1921); relief of animals, In re Coleman's Estate, 167
Cal. 212, 138 Pac. 992 (1914); patriotic purposes, Sargent v. Cornish, 54 N.H. 18
(1873); In re De Long's Estate, 140 Misc. 92, 25o N.Y.S. 5o4 (Surr. Ct. 1930; promo-
tion of minority causes, Tainter v. Clark, 87 Mass. (5 Allen) 66 (1862).
'The problem of deciding what is socially beneficial in many cases becomes
a matter of degree. Thus, one court upholds a trust seeking to disseminate the
doctrines of socialism, Peth v. Spear, 63 Wash. 291, 115 Pac. 164 (igii), while another
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The recent case of In re Robbin's Estate5 from the Supreme Court
of California illustrates the problem of assessing the social value of
a trust established for an unusual purpose. The testator left a fund
in trust to be used for the support, maintenance, medical attention
and education of Negro children whose father or mother, or both, have
been imprisoned, detained, or committed "as a result of the convic-
tion of a crime or misdemeanor of a political nature."6 In order to aid
the trustees in determining what was meant by crimes of a political
nature -the testator mentioned prosecutions and convictions under the
Smith Act; appearances before the House Committee on Un-American
Activities and Internal Securities Committee and prosecutions under
the Taft-Hartley Act and McCarran-Walters Immigration Act.7
By a vote of four to three the California Supreme Court upheld
the -trust saying
Any risk that a parent might be induced to commit a crime
he otherwise would not commit because of the possibility that
his child might become a beneficiary of this trust is far out-
weighted by the interest of 'the innocent children involved and
society's interest ,in them. To -hold otherwise would... 'in-
corporate into the law of the land as legal precepts the sayings
that the sins of fathers are visited upon their children...,s
The majority, then, -took 'the view ,that -this trust had sufficient social
value to be considered "charitable." The primary consideration, un-
der 'the majority analysis, is the benefit bestowed on the children in-
volved and the resulting benefit on society as a whole. The majority
went on ,to point out that, even though the testator's .motive, at least
invalidates a trust which advances the precepts of spiritualism. In re Hummelten-
berg [1923] 1 Ch. 237. Generally trusts to erect monuments are charitable only if
they pay tribute to distinguished leaders. Owens v. Owens' Ex'r, 236 Ky. 1S8
32 S.W.2d 73, (1930); Eliot v. Attwill, 232 Mass 517, 122 N.E. 648 (igig). An English
court concluded that a monument to philosopher John Locke was not charitable, In
re Jones, 79 L.T. 154 (1898). However, an American court found that a monument
paying tribute to a man virtually unknown outside his own community was charit-
able, Lawrence v. Prosser, 89 N.J. Eq. 248, 1o4 At. 772 (1918).
621 Cal. Rptr. 797, 731 P.2d 573 (1962).
8371 P.2d at 573.
The testator also mentioned in the trust instrument any statute, "seeking to pro-
scribe, limit, abolish, enjoin or regulate the teaching, advising, adopting, advocating
or implementing any political, geopolitical, or social political doctrine" and any con-
viction or prosecution "resulting from any activity in the organization, or assisting
in the organization, of any trade union movement; or from the violation of any
injunction of any court, restraining, enjoining or limiting in any way the activities
of any union of working men and women in the United States, or restricting and
limiting the right to collectively bargain or go out on strike." 371 P.2d at 574.
8371 P.2d at 575-
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in part, was to encourage violations of laws of a political nature, the
purpose for which the property is to be used rather than the motive
of the testator determines whether a -trust is a valid charitable trust.9
It is not clear if the minority concurred in the view that the testa-
tor's motives, however improper should not invalidate the trust.10 In
any event they believed the trust was invalid because it tended in fact
to induce violations of the law. The minority position is that a court
cannot uphold a trust that tends to induce such violations, regard-
less of whatever other benefits the trust may confer on society or any
of its parts, and without regard to the testator's motives. The majority
takes a more liberal approach and declares that the trust in the Rob-
bin's case is valid because of the benefits accruing to the class of
children involved and despite 'the fact that it contains a possible in-
ducement to violate certain laws.
It is well settled that a court, in deciding whether or not a trust
is for a charitable purpose, will not accept the motives of the settlor
as controlling." The court instead will consider the result and effect
of the trust upon society and mankind generally.'2 The entire court
in the Robbin's case recognized that the testator's motive in estab-
lishing the trust was to encourage challenges to "political" type laws
of which he disapproved and that he hoped that these challenges
would, in some way, lead to their removal. 3 What prompted the
GIn re Butin's Estate, 81 Cal. App. 2d 76, 183 P. 2d 304 (1947).
"The minority apparently considered the motives of the testator an irrelevant
consideration. Since there is no express declaration it may be inferred that they
agreed with the majority that the motives of the settlor are not controlling, since
that is the established law of California and the generally accepted view. See notes
9 supra and ii infra.
"Eliot's Appeal, 74 Conn. 586, 51 Atl. 558 (19o2); French v. Calkins, 252 Ill.
243, 96 N.E. 877 (1911); Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Attorney General,
235 Mass. 288, 126 N.E. 521 (1920); Bills v. Pease, ix6 Me. 98, 1oo At. 146 (917);
First Camden Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Collins, 11o N.J. Eq. 623, i6o Atl. 848
(1932); In re Smith's Estate, 181 Pa. 109, 37 Atl. 114 (1897); 2A Bogert, Trusts
and Trustees § 364 (1953), 4 Scott, Trusts §§ 348, 368 (2d ed. 1956); Restatement
(Second), Trusts § 368, comment d (1959).
"In re Loring's Estate, 29 Cal. 2d 423, 175 P.2d 524 (1946); Baker v. Hickman,
127 Kan. 340, 273 Pac. 480 (1929); Chamberlain v. Van Horn, 246 Mass. 462, 141
N.E. 111 (1923); Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867); Woodstown
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Snelbaker, 136 N.J. Eq. 62, 40 A.2d 222, aff'd 133 N.J.L.
256, 44 A.2d 21o (1944); In re Frasch's Will, 245 N.Y. 174, 156 N.E. 656 (1927);
In re Archambault's Estate, 308 Pa. 549, 162 AtI. 8oi (1932).
aThe testator expressly declared his purpose in his declaration of trust. "It
is because I wish to preserve the right to dissent, the right to differ and to be
different, that I have created the trust estate set up in this will." He also stated
that he believed "in full, complete and unabridged freedom of expression in a dem-
ocratic society. .." 371 P.2d at 575.
19631
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minority to invalidate the trust was the vice of actually inducing il-
legality and not the fact that the testator's motive was to remove or
change certain laws.
The modern trend in the United States is to hold valid charitable
trusts which have a change in law as their purpose, as long as the
methods used to effect the change are peaceful and lawful.14 Trusts
for improvement in government, 15 promotion of women's rights'0
and prohibition of liquor sales17 have all been upheld despite the
fact that the accomplishment of ,these purposes involved peaceful
changes in existing laws. The English courts and some American
courts take the opposite view basing their position on the theory that
the presently existing laws must be considered correct until they are
changed.1s This rationale has been severely criticized, and most writers
support the more liberal American view.19 It would appear anomalous
for a court which values democratic processes to support the proposi-
tion that all laws now on the books are correct and not subject to
criticism and evaluation by those who advocate -that they should be
changed by lawful means. This would appear to be true whether
or not one is speaking in the context of charitable .trusts.20 It is simi-
larly apparent that a court in holding a trust invalid for the reason
that it seeks to change the law by peaceful methods would implicitly
deny 'the social value of the right to dissent. Thus the reluctance of
many American courts to reach such a result is understandable.
Until the Robbin's case, however, no court had upheld a charitable
trust which induces or might possibly induce violations of the law,
regardless of whether its purpose, express or implied, is to change the
"Collier v. Lindley, 203 Cal. 641, 266 Pac. 526 (1928); Garrison v. Little, 75 I1.
App. 402 (1898); George v. Braddock, 45 NJ. Eq. 757, 18 At. 881 (Ct. Err. & App.
1898); Buell v. Gardner, 83 Misc. 513, 144 N.Y.S. 945 (Sup. Ct. 1914); Taylor v.
Hoag, 273 Pa. 194, 116 Ad. 826 (1922).
15Collier v. Lindley, 203 Cal. 641, 266 Pac. 526 (1928).
'1 Garrison v. Little, 75 Ill. App. 402 (1898).
"7Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F.sd io8 (3d Cir. 1941); Sherman v.
Congregational Home Missionary Soc'y, 176 Mass. 349, 57 N.E. 702 (190o).
a'Inland Revenue Comm'rs v. Temperance Council, 42 T.L.R. 618 (P. 1926);
Bowditch v. Attorney General, 241 Mass. 168, 134 N.E. 796 (1922); Jackson v.
Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867); In re Kellen's Will, 124 Misc. 720, 209
N.Y.S. 206 (Surr. Ct. 1925).
"Comment, 6 Calif. L. Rev. 478 (1928); Comment, 71 U. Pa. L. Rev. 89 (1922);
4 So. Cal. L. Rev. 418 (1931); 37 Va. L. Rev. 988 (1951); 32 Yale L.J 295 0922); See
also 2A Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 378 (1953); 4 Scott, Trusts § 3744 (2d ed. 1956).
mAn obvious example of the well recognized right to campaign for peaceful
change in law is shown by the prevalence of lobbyists and pressure groups attempt-
ing to influence legislators at both federal and state levels.
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law.- ' The inducement in the Robbin's case is at least indirect in the
sense that the benefit goes to the child of the offender rather than to
the offender himself. The case nevertheless represents an expansion
of the scope of permissible purposes in the field of charitable trusts.
The question arises as to what extent the Robbin's holding author-
izes the California courts to uphold trusts which contain inducements
to violate any law. It at least authorizes a court to balance the harm
of a possible indirect inducement against the benefits bestowed on the
direct beneficiaries. It is hardly likely that the decision will be con-
strued as generally allowing the settlor of a charitable trust to induce
violations of the law purposely and actually so long as he bestows
some socially desirable benefits on some other group. If this is the case
then every political nonconformist could, with sufficient financial
backing, devise a technically valid trust which would, in effect, pro-
mote incessant illegal acts. The courts for obvious reasons should not
encourage such devices. This is not to suggest -that a trust which seeks
to change the law by lawful means should be declared invalid.
As an isolated proposition the rule of the Robbins case does not
appear harsh or extreme. Clearly, society will receive subtantial bene-
fit through the provisions for the care and support of the children in-
volved. Therefore, it is not per se inequitable for a court to uphold
such benefits even in the face of a possible inducement to violate the
law, especially if the court considers the inducement remote. More-
over, countenancing such an indirect inducement is by no means
tantamount to approving a direct inducement in which the one who is
induced also benefits. As a practical consideration trusts containing
characteristics of the type presented in the Robbins case may sur-
vive because no one will attack them -if they are created inter vivos.
However, this would not normally be true in the case of testamentary
trusts where ,the heirs or the executor are likely to challenge the legality
of the trust, as in the principal case.
2tThere are very few cases on the subject for the obvious reason that few people
are inclined to dispose of their funds in such a way as to encourage or induce vio-
lations of the law. In an early English case a bequest which sought to purchase
the freedom of those imprisoned for failing to pay fines for violations of game laws
was held invalid as tending to encourage violations of those laws. Thrupp v.
Collette, 26 Beav. 125, 53 Eng. Rep. 844 (Ch. 1858). Professor Scott makes the follow-
ing comment on the subject. "Where a policy is articulated in a statute making
certain conduct a criminal offense, then, of course, a trust is illegal if its performance
involves such criminal conduct, or if it tends to encourage such conduct." 4 Scott,
Trusts, § 377 (ad ed. 1956); cf. Attorney General v. Guise, 2 Vern. 266, 23 Eng. Rep.
772 (Ch. 1692); Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. i i8go); In re Sterne's
Estate, 147 Misc. 59, 263 N.Y.S. 304 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
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At any rate, the courts whose function is to secure adherence to
the law as well as to mould and interpret the law should be extremely
reluotant ,to approve any legal device which tends to encourage or in-
duce illegality. For many years the principle that any trust which
tends to induce a breach of ithe law is invalid has been firmly en-
trenched -in the law of trusts. 22 Or, conversely stated, any trust con-
,taining such an inducement has been viewed as harmful enough to
society ,to contravene any other social value the trust may include. It
is one thing to visit the sins of the father upon his children and quite
another ,to entice -the father to commit the sins.
This would be especially true in the case of the charitable trust
which the law treats with considerable favor. Such trusts are accorded
liberal rules of construction,2 3 they are permitted to be perpetual in
duration,24 and, in many cases, they are exempt from taxation.25 These
advantages, along with many others, 26 make the charitable trust a
favorite of the law. Thus, a court in upholding any charitable rust
must find ,that its social values more 'than offset "... the detriments
which arise out of ,the special privileges accorded to that trust.' 2 7
"See Note 21 Supra.
Oln re Chucovich's Estate, io3 Colo. 104, 83 P.2d 328 (1938); Woodruff v. Marsh,
6q Conn. 125 (1893); Coit v. Comstock, 51 Conn. 352 (1884); Webb v. Webb, 340 Ill.
407, 172 N.E. 730 (1930); Morgan v. National Trust Bank, 331 Ill. 888, 162 N.E.
188 (1928); Wilson v. First Nat'l Bank, 164 Iwoa 402, 145 N.W. 948 (1914); Gear-
hart v. Richardson, io9 Ohio St. 418, 142 N.E. 89o (1924); 4 Scott, Trusts § 369
(2d 1956).
"'Colonial Trust Co. v. Waldron, 112 Conn. 216, 152 Atl. 69 (193o); Montgomery
v. Carlton, 99 Fla. 152, 126 So. 135 (1930); Stewart v. Coshow,'238 Mo. 662, 142
S.W. 283 (1911); Merrill v. American Baptist Missionary Union, 73 N.H. 414, 62
Atl. 647 (19o5); Webster v. Wiggin, 19 R.I. 73, 31 At!. 824 (1895).
"5City of Waycross v. Waycross Say. & Trust Co., 146 Ga. 68, 90 S.E. 382 (1916);
In re Altman's Estate, 87 Misc. 255, 149 N.Y.S. 6o1 (Surr. Ct. 1914); In re Hunter's
Estate, 147 Wash. 216, 265 Pac. 466 (1928). For example of a typical statutory ex-
emption see Minn. Stat. Ann. § 309.51 (1961).
"Ciharitable trusts are accorded lenient treatment in the application of the
rules of vesting, power of alienation and accumulations. Kasey v. Fidelity Trust
CO., 131 Ky. 609, 115 S.W. 739 (19o9); In re Brown's Estate, 198 Mich. 544, 165 N.W.
929 (i97); Williams v. Williams, 215 N.C. 739, 3 S.E.2d 334 (1939); Moore v.
Sellers, 201 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). See 2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees §
353 (1953)-
Also the liberal Cy Pres doctrine is applicable only to charitable trusts. Gen-
erally the doctrine allows a court to substitute a charitable purpose other than
the one originally provided for in the trust where the original purpose is im-
practical or impossible to accomplish. For general discussion of the applicability
and scope of this unusual doctrine see Bradway, Tendencies in the Application of
the Cy Pres Doctrine, 5 Temp. L.Q. 489 (1931); Cy Pres: A Suggested Approach,
z Ala. L. Rev. 217 (1949); 2A Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 431 (1953); 4 Scott,
Trusts §§ 395-99 (2d ed. 1956).212A Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 361 (1953)-
